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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
pleading. Whether any matter is unnecessarily inserted is de-
termined by the relevancy of the proof at trial. If the matter
would be admissible at the trial, it is not unnecessarily inserted,
even though it is scandalous or prejudicial. If plaintiff's assertions
in the complaint would be admissible at trial, they would be relevant
and therefore not subject to a motion to strike under CPLR
3024(b).
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE
CPLR 3101(c) and (d): "Material prepared for litigation" and
"attorney's work product."
Subdivisions (c) and (d) of CPLR 3101 have provided the
bar with an abundance of case law. Since the Surveys last install-
ment,16 ' there have been significant developments in the area
governed by these two subdivisions.
The ground work for judicial action
Prior to Finegold v. Lewis 162 and Kandel v. Tocher,113 there
had been a decided lack of uniformity in the judicial interpretation
of subdivisions (c) and (d) .164 Under these exclusionary pro-
visions two questions of interpretation had frequently arisen before
the courts, viz., whether accident reports made by an employee
to his employer, and whether those made by an insured to his
insurer are proper subjects for disclosure. Prior to Finegold
and Kandel, the first department lower courts held statements by
an insured to his insurer to be proper material for disclosure,
whereas the lower courts of the second department reached con-
flicting decisions on the question of the discoverability of such
statements.
Speight v. Allen 16 5 followed the holdings of prior first depart-
ment cases and held these statements to be outside the purview of
CPLR 3101(d). It relied heavily on the language employed by
the court in Rios v. Donovan 166 concerning the liberality to be ap-
plied in interpreting the CPLR and more specifically Article 31.
161 The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 ST. JOHNs L. REv.
406 (1965).
162 22 App. Div. 2d 447, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't 1965).
186322 App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1965).
164 Speight v. Allen, 44 Misc. 2d 1072, 255 N.Y.S2d 918 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1965), discusses this conflict1 65 Ibid.
16621 App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1st Dep't 1964); discussed
in The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 178,
210 (1964), and 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR. 3120, supp. commentary 58 (1965).
Rios is a leading case delineating the scope of disclosure with which the
prartitioner should be well acquainted by now.
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The disclosure provisions of article 31 of the CPLR were intended
to enlarge the permissible use of pretrial procedure. The purpose of
disclosure procedures is to advance the function of a trial, to ascertain
truth and to accelerate the disposition of suits.8 7
The court indicated that these statements "are not necessarily or
exclusively material prepared for litigation," "IS (and were therefore
not protected by subdivision (d)). This reasoning was to be
rejected by the first and second departments in Kandel and
Finegold respectively.
Finegold v. Lewis: 169 the second department's solution
In Finegold, the second department unified the prior diverse
holdings of its lower courts with respect to statements made by an
insured to his insurer. The case involved an attempt to secure
a statement made by the defendant to her insurer prior to the
commencement of the action. Plaintiff sought to find therein
admissions by defendant or inconsistencies with defendant's sub-
sequent testimony. The court stated that the insurer was a
defendant in a very real sense and therefore held that the state-
ment was protected by CPLR 3101(d). It further stated that
"the relative dates of the delivery of the statement and of the
commencement of the action are immaterial," 170 thereby expanding
the scope of subdivision (d) quite explicitly. The court dis-
tinguished these statements from reports of an employee to an
employer made in the ordinary course of business, apparently
implying that such reports would be a proper subject for disclosure.
Kandel v. Tocher: 171 a solution and a problem
In Kandel, a case factually similar to Finegold, plaintiff sought
discovery and inspection of "the accident report and statements,
photographs, diagrams, etc., relating to the accident made prior to
the commencement of this action." The issue again was whether
the material was "prepared for litigation" within the meaning of
subdivision (d). The court stated that automobile insurance is
simply litigation insurance and that virtually anything which an
insurer or its employees do with respect to an accident is in
preparation for litigation. It thereby held that such reports were
entitled to subdivision (d) protection. The court stressed the
importance of encouraging complete and candid disclosure of all
187 Id. at 411, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
18 Speight v. Allen, supra note 164, at 1074, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
189 22 App. Div. 2d 447, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't 1965).170 id. at 448, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
1L7122 App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1965).
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salient facts by an insured to his insurer, and distinguished liability
insurance from all other types of insurance. In addition, it stated
that no special circumstances were present which would remove the
protection of subdivision (d).172
In one part of his opinion, Justice Breitel stated that the
material might even be excluded as an attorney's work product
under subdivision (c) of 3101. Such language might be inter-
preted as a mandate to begin a broader application of subdivision
(c)'s absolute protection-a protection not intended by the Advisory
Committee.
Some investigation into the background of CPLR 3101 is
necessary at this juncture. By now it is well known to anyone
conversant with Article 31 that the Advisory Committee intended
a codification of Hickman v. Taylor' 73 in delineating the scope
of disclosure in general. Toward that end it granted only a
qualified protection to both an "attorney's work product" and
"material prepared for litigation."' 174  However, the legislature
amended the original draft (without explanation) and granted
absolute immunity to an "attorney's work product." ' 7  Since the
intention of the Advisory Committee was thwarted, subdivision
(c) poses a considerable threat to the success of any attorney
seeking disclosure of items similar to those sought in Kandel. For
no showing of special circumstances, however persuasive, will
free such an item from subdivision '(c)'s protection. And
although the courts have not been prone to declare an item
to be an "attorney's work product" where there is justification
for finding that it is "material prepared for litigation" and thus
only qualifiedly protected, this possibility nonetheless exists. justice
Breitel's aforementioned dictum emphasizes this distinct possibility.
172 The protection of subdivision (d) is only qualified because it is not
granted if "the court finds that the material [sought] can no longer be
duplicated because of a change in conditions and that withholding it will
result in injustice or undue hardship." CPLR 3101(d). See The Biannual
Survey of New York Practice, 38 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 406, 435-37 (1964),
which advances the position which the first department adopted in Kandel.
173329 U.S. 495 (1947). Hickman set forth the category of items which
is exempt from disclosure under federal practice. It loosely described
them as the "work product of the lawyer" and granted them only conditional
immunity. See The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 178, 218 n.169 (1964).
7 FnasT REP. 119.
3's Fn'vn REP. 443. It should be noted that the so-called Fifth Report
was made by the Senate Finance Committee and the Assembly Ways and
Means Committee-not the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure.
These first two committees effected many changes in the Advisory Com-
mittee's Final Report, and in many cases without stating any reason for
such action. The change wrought upon CPLR 3101 is a perfect example.
Granting absolute as opposed to qualified protection to an attorney's work
product seems to be a significant move, yet no explanation was offered
therefor by the legislature.
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It is submitted that a showing of the special circumstances
enumerated in CPLR 3101(d) should also be a sufficient ground
for allowing disclosure of what presently is absolutely immune as an
"attorney's work product! 178 Therefore, it would seem appropriate
that subdivision (c) be repealed and that the "attorney's work
product" be included within present subdivision (d), thereby giving
both items only a qualified protection. The threat of absolute
exclusion and its resultant consequences seem far too great a
price to pay when weighed against the intent of the Advisory
Committee and the liberality which will have to be accorded
to Article 31 if it is to be supported in its broad function in
litigation. 1
Finegold and Kandel in the fourth department
Gugluizza v. Gugluizza 1 78 involved the precise question found
in Finegold and Kandel. Plaintiff sought disclosure of a signed
statement which was given by defendant to his insurer before
the commencement of the action. The court held the statement
to be within the purview of subdivision (d) solely on the basis
of Finegold and Kandel. The significance of the case is that
the holdings of the first and second departments were deemed
controlling by a lower court of the fourth department absent
any definitive statement from its own appellate division.
Reports inade in the regular course of business
Another Monroe County case 179 serves to illustrate, how-
ever, that not all accident reports receive even the qualified pro-
tection of subdivision (d). In this negligence action arising out
of an automobile accident, plaintiffs sought, inter alia, discovery
and inspection of reports made to defendant by its employee con-
cerning the accident. The court distinguished Finegold and
Kandel on the ground that there the reports were made not
to a liability insurer but to the defendant corporation and were
made within the scope of the operator's employment. These are
precisely the type of reports -which were alluded to in Kandel as
being a proper subject for disclosure: "[their] purpose is not
limited to, or even predominantly that of, preparing for a litigation
risk." 180
176 Such was the intention of the Advisory Committee and in addition
it appears to be a more equitable and logical rule. FIRST RF'. 117.
177 See Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S2d 818 (1st Dep't
1964).
178 45 Misc. 2d 868, 257 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1965).
179Davis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 45 Misc. 2d 1006, 258 N.Y.S.2d 573
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1965).
'180Kandel v. Tocher, 22 App. Div. 2d 513, 515-16, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900
(1st Dep't 1965).
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On the other hand, in Reese v. Long Island R.R.,1'8 in an
apparent effort to restrict its holding in Finegold, the second
department reversed a lower court holding 1 8 2 which had allowed
disclosure of photographs taken by defendant at the scene of the
accident, and of an eye witness' statement. The lower court had
held that these items were proper subjects for disclosure on the
ground that they were prepared in the regular course of de-
fendant's business. The appellate division, in denying disclosure,
held that to carry such reasoning to its logical conclusion would
render any accident reports made in the regular course of business
non-discoverable whether or not made in preparation for litigation.
It thereby implied that it had not intended such an illogical result
to flow from its decision in the Finegold case. However, such a
holding does not seem consonant with the court's statement in
'Finegold distinguishing insured to insurer reports from employee
to employer reports. The apparent conflict betveen, the second
and fourth departments will only lead to increased litigation
until the question is finally resolved.
Reports made prior to the commencement of an action
The influence of Finegold is also manifested in Zavaglia
v. Englert 8 3 wherein the court held that reports made by defendant
to his insurer and statements of witnesses, even though obtained
prior to the commencement of the action, are nonetheless "material
prepared for litigation" within the meaning of CPLR 3101(d) (2).
Express authority for such a holding can be found in Finegold
wherein that court stated: "The relative dates of the delivery
of the statement and of the commencement of the action are
immaterial." 184 It should also be noted that the instant case expands
Finegold by explicitly affording the protection of 3101(d) (2) to
statements of a witness.'8 5
Unusual facts do not prevent disclosure ipso facto
In Colbert v. Home Indemnity Co., 8 6 the action was based on
defendant's alleged lack of good faith in settling a prior case.
:18124 App. Div. 2d 581, 262 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1965).
182 Reese v. Long Island R.R., 46 Misc. 2d 5, 259 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1965).
183 23 App. Div. 2d 790, 258 N.Y.S2d 720 (2d Dep't 1965).
'14 Finegold v. Lewis, 22 App. Div. 2d 447, 448, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358, 359
(2d Dep't 1965).
285 A further expansion of the Finegold and Kandel doctrine can be found in
Silberberg v. Hotpoint Div. of General Elec. Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 754, 259
N.Y.S.2d 60 (1st Dep't 1965), wherein the court held that the report of tests
conducted by defendant's engineer on washing machines following the in-
stitution of plaintiff's personal injury action fell within the protection of
CPLR 3101(d).
186 45 Misc. 2d 1093, 259 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1965).
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In the prior case, Colbert was the defendant and Home In-
demnity, his insurer, had secured reports of the accident which
reports were in the files of a former agent at the time of the
institution of the present action. The court held that the reports
sought were "material and necessary in the prosecution" of plain-
tiff's action and therefore were a proper subject for disclosure.
In distinguishing this situation from the one in Finegold, the
court stated that in the prior action defendants were working
primarily for plaintiff (in the instant case) when they gathered
the evidence sought to be disclosed here, and that, therefore, it
was immaterial where they (defendants) stood in the present
action.
No protection for the non-liability insurer
In Raylite Elec. Corp. v. New York Fire Ins. Co., 8 7 plaintiff-
insured sought discovery of the reports prepared for the defendant-
insurer by a fire adjuster and a property damage expert. The
court held that such reports did not become "material prepared
for litigation" merely by virtue of their being turned over to
an attorney. The court distinguished this case from Kandel solely
on the ground that no liability insurance was involved herein.
Thus, it would appear that where other than liability insurance
is involved, the party seeking to preclude disclosure must show
that the material was in fact prepared for the express purpose of
litigation and not merely in the ordinary course of business un-
motivated by the thought of litigation. Situations can certainly be
imagined wherein a non-liability insurer could be doing work which
could more easily be classified as "material prepared for litigation"
than that of a liability insurer. In such situations, the net result
of these cases is that the non-liability insurer would be put to
the proof on the question of whether the work is material pre-
pared for litigation whereas the liability insurer would enjoy a
presumption (if not a conclusion) that it is. Such, however, is
the present state of the law.
CPLR 3103: Non-resident defendant entitled to reimbursement
for EBT expenses.
The notion that protective orders are not a proper means for
requiring one party to pay the other's disclosure expenses'" seems
to be losing strength. An indication of this can be found in
Buffone v. Aronson'8 9 wherein defendant Aronson, a resident of
287 46 Misc. 2d 361, 259 N.Y.S2d 641 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1965).
1ss Pakter v. Eli Lilly & Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 810, 243 N.Y.S.2d 425
(1st Dep't 1963), would appear to convey such a notion.
18945 Misc. 2d 454, 257 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1965).
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